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Luddite, self-assurance that tomorrow
will look just like today.
JAN VAN TOL

Captain, U.S. Navy

Osiel, Mark J. Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military
Discipline & the Law of War. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction, 1999. 398pp. $39.95

It is a fundamental belief of thoughtful
military personnel that what they do,
even in the heat of battle, remains a
moral enterprise. This important and
careful volume critically assesses an important legal pillar of that belief: that
moral soldiers are to obey only lawful
orders. It is often said that soldiers are
expected to disobey unlawful orders,
especially those ordering atrocities or
violations of the laws of war. Since
Nuremberg, it is held that “superior orders” do not constitute a defense against
charges of war crimes. Osiel makes it
abundantly clear that these nostrums are
far from certain or legally reliable as
presently understood.
Mark J. Osiel is a professor of law at the
University of Iowa and the author of
Mass Atrocity: Collective Memory and the
Law (Transaction, 1999). He knows
whereof he speaks: he has interviewed extensively the perpetrators and the victims
of Argentina’s “dirty war,” and his grasp
of the relevant literature (legal, philosophical, and military) on the subject of
obedience is capacious.
With care and precision, the author challenges the present standard, which requires
soldiers to disobey orders that are “manifestly” illegal. This standard, he argues, is
fraught with unclarity and is far too permissive of illegal acts in war.
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The book is much more than a dry legal
treatise about a point of law. Osiel writes
with real passion and breadth. He includes
important chapters on the psychology of
small military units and the requisites for
their cohesion and combat effectiveness.
He is careful throughout to acknowledge
the limitations of law as a constraint on
combat behavior. He argues with zeal for
the legal and practical possibility of doing
better than the present legal standard in
encouraging moral responsibility in officers and soldiers. In the end, Osiel transcends the genre of legal analysis entirely,
grounding his ethical appeal in the very
nature and basis of the military profession itself. He is Aristotelian when he
closely links moral conduct in war with
the virtues that define excellence in the
profession of arms itself.
In addition, Osiel is helpful in a practical
sense. He suggests how best to use Judge
Advocate General advisers on military
staffs, and he offers concrete examples of
subordinates who, faced with unclear orders (deliberate or otherwise), managed
by means of requests for clarification to
avoid committing war crimes.
Osiel dissects the various ways in which
atrocities are committed: “(1) by stimulating violent passions among the troops
(‘from below’); (2) through organized,
directed campaigns of terror (‘from
above’); (3) by tacit connivance between
higher and lower echelons, each with its
own motives; and (4) by brutalization of
subordinates to foster their aggressiveness in combat.” Since the causes are diverse, each type will require its own
unique approach to control it; but Osiel’s
overall point is profound: “The evidence
examined here suggests that effective
prohibitions against atrocity depend
much less on the foreseeability to soldiers
of criminal prosecution after the fact
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than on the way soldiers are organized
before and during combat.” In other
words, post-facto law enforcement is only
one tool, and not a powerful one at that,
in the struggle to prevent atrocities and
war crimes.
It is this breadth of treatment that lifts
Osiel’s discussion far above stereotypical
legal analysis and makes it a truly significant contribution to the literature of military professionalism and military ethics.
Obeying Orders connects the moral argument deeply to the professional commitments of soldiering. Members of the
military profession should be encouraged
to exercise their ethical judgment over as
wide a scope as possible within the functional requirements of military effectiveness and efficiency.
It would be a shame and a mistake if only
military and civilian lawyers chose to
read this profound meditation on the
moral foundations of soldiering itself. Informed by military practicality, and respectful of the possibilities of deepening
and widening the highest senses of military professionalism, Obeying Orders is
the first book on professional ethics that a
seasoned officer ought to read.
MARTIN L. COOK

Professor of Ethics
U.S. Army War College

Smith, George W. The Siege at Hue. Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner, 1999. 195pp. $49.95

George W. Smith has provided an excellent historical summary of the battle of
Hue, based on his personal experience as
an information officer assigned to the 1st
Division of the Army of the Republic of
(South) Vietnam (ARVN), and on
after-action reports, articles, and
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interviews. The book highlights the complexities and dynamics of conducting
military operations in urban terrain, particularly in a combat environment.
Hue had been the imperial capital of
Vietnam, and it was the country’s cultural and intellectual center. It was South
Vietnam’s third-largest city, strategically
located in the country’s narrowest part,
near the coast. One of the few cities
where until 1968 there had been no U.S.
combat presence, it was virtually undefended and consequently a lucrative target for the North Vietnamese army and
the Viet Cong.
The battle of Hue was the largest single
engagement of the Vietnam War. It
lasted from 31 January to 25 February
1968 and (not counting civilian deaths)
claimed 5,713 casualties on both sides.
Smith describes the battle as a classic
joint and combined operation. The city
was divided into two areas of responsibility, with the South Vietnamese army assigned the mission of retaking the
northern portion and the U.S. Marines
that of regaining control south of the
Perfume River.
The urban conditions in Hue were comparable to those of Dodge City in the
American “Old West.” Some buildings
had wooden fronts, porches, and sidewalks; the streets were narrow, and buildings were densely concentrated. In the
middle of Hue, however, was a virtually
impregnable fortress known as the Citadel, with towers, ramparts, moats, concrete walls, and bunkers. The walls were
twenty-six feet high and in some sections
forty feet thick. The moat was ninety feet
wide at many points and up to twelve feet
deep. The Imperial Palace, another enclave within Hue, was surrounded by a
twenty-foot wall.
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